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ABSTRACT
This paper explores a relatively new executive
perquisite, golden parachutes (GP's). The
number of firms that have or are planning to
adopt GP's is discussed. Features of GP's are
outlined. Reasons that firms have adopted GP's
are explored. Finally, a series of arguments
against this practice are laid out.
INTRODUCTION
If a top executive of a major corporation
simply stuffed a suitcase with company
money and stuck it under his bed as an
insurance policy against losing his job in
an unfriendly takeover of his company, his
action would be seen as outright theft....
[Though] there are clearly legal differen-
ces between cash-filled suitcases and the
so-called golden parachute contracts ....
the ethical differences are hard to
discern—Business Week editorial (October
4, 1982).
"Golden parachutes" (GP's) were "the hottest
new executive suite perk fof 1982]" (Klein,
1982, p. 56). A typical GP guarantees a spe-
cified number of senior executives several
years salary, fringe benefits and bonuses if
they eire forced to leave or if they choose to
leave when a change of control takes place.
GP's are a relatively new phenomenon. One of
the first GP's was reputedly written for
Reliance Electric executives during the
takeover battle with Exxon in 1979 (Kleinfield,
p. D1). By 1982, estimates of the number of
major American firms with or considering GP's
ranged from one third (McLaughlin, p. 47) to
one half (fowrbes. May 24, 1982). There pro-
bably are, however, many less GP's actually
enacted than actively considered since manage-
ment does not appear to be interested in making
public the existence of potential peirachutes.
The intense, indeed often virulent, criticism
of this perk in the business press, as seen in
the Business Week editorial above, makes such
contrac'ts worthy of close scrutiny. Business
has come to expect criticisms of its practices
in the populeir press but when Business Week,
Dun's Review (May, 1981) Irarbss fHay 24, 1982),
Fortune (December 13, 1982) and The Wall ̂ tree_t_
Journal (December 8, 1982) all publish articles
and/or editorials critical of this practice,
business would be well advised to take note.
The perception of unethical behavior is clearly
widespread.
The most likely reason behind the popularity of
GP's is the recent increase in merger activity.
In 1981 alone there were over 2300 reported
mergers (McLaughlin, p. 47). Mergers create
substantial uncertainly for managers and may be
the single largest source of Involuntary execu-
tive turnover. According to Business Week;
...a new survey by "outplacement" consul-
tants Drake Beam Morln, Inc. shows that of
1300 executives—with incomes of between
$30,000 and $125,000—who were "severed"
in the 18 months ended August 31 [19823, a
disquieting 32$ were let go during mer-
gers, takeovers, and the like (September
27, 1982, p. 118).
Several recent studies seem to support this
conclusion. For exaimple, one study indicates
that within three years of a merger 52$ of the
executives of the acquired firm leave (Wall
Street Journal, August 18, 1981). Addition-
ally, over 1500 Pullman employees (not all
executives) have been dismissed since late 198O
when Pullman was acquired by Wheelabrator-Frye
(Wall street Jounial, July 7, 1982). Since
Allegheny acquired Sunbeam, about half of
Sunbeam's corporate staff of 160 employees has
departed (Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1982).
Immediately after RCA sold Picker Corporation
to General Electric of Great Britain the top
eight executives of Picker were fired (New
York Times, April 6, 1982).
Within this environment of high levels of
merger activity and the resulting executive
turnover which merger activity implies, the
popularity of GP's has grown explosively.
Since all that is needed to implement a GP is
boeird approval, not shareholder approval, GP's
can be (and have been) added to executive com-
pensation programs. With the 1980 amendments
of Section 4021 of regulation SK, the SEC does
require "after the fact" disclosure of special
executive compensation programs in proxy state-
ments or 10-K reports. It is, however, still
possible for firms to draft GP's but to with-
hold implementation until a hostile takeover
looms.
METHODOLOGY
In this study the executive compensation sec-
tions of the proxy statements for twenty one
firms known to have GP's were examined. This
sample of GP's was assembled using a two-stage
process. First, the proxy statements of a ran-
dom sample of fifty of the Fortune 300 firms
were reviewed for any evidence of GP's.
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Subsequent examination revealed that seven (14
percent of the sample) of these firms had GP's
in place. This is consistent with a study by
Ward Howell which found 15 percent of the 1000
largest U.S. firms with GP's (Morrison, 1982,
p. 82). Second, a review of the business press
revealed fourteen additional firms with GP's.
These fourteen were added to the seven from the
random sample to constitute a study sample of
twenty one. Table 1 provides a list of firms
comprising the overall sample. In parentheses
behind each firm's name is its ranking in the
1982 Fortune 500 list. Five of the firms were
in the top 100, four in the second 100, seven
in the third 100, one each in the fourth and

























* = Comes from random sample
Content analysis was conducted on each of the
21 proxy statements. The analysis focused on
the following six questions:
(1) How many executives are covered?
(2) How is "change of control" defined?
(3) Does the GP apply to voluntary as well as
involuntary termination of employment?
(4) Are there "giveback" provisions if the
executive obtains other employment?
(5) What compensation is provided?
(6) What other benefits are provided?
RESULTS
Number of Executives Covered
All but three of the proxies examined stated
the number of classes of executives covered by
their GP agreements. Coverage ranged from one
executive (Warnaco) to 80 at Kimberly-Clark.
One firm (Superior Oil) approved GP's for all
present and future officers. The average
number of executives covered by GP's in com-
panies reporting a specific number is nearly
sixteen. The overall average is undoubtedly
higher since the number of executives covered
at Superior Oil was excluded from this average.
Change of Control
In seven of the proxy statements "change of
control" was specifically defined as any party
acquiring a certain percentage of the voting
shares. Those percentages ranged from 20 to 35
percent. In four of the seven cases and one in
which a percentage of the voting stock was not
specified, "change of control" could also occur
if the majority of the board changed. No defi-
nition was provided in seven statements and the
definition was "provided elsewhere" in six
others. In one statement "change of control"
was simply defined as a purchase of a substan-
tial number of shares.
"Walkaway" Clauses
In twelve of the twenty one GP's examined, the
proxy statements explicitly state that the GP
applied to voluntary as well as involuntary
termination. In only two cases (Con Agra and
Warnaco) were the benefits in any way reduced
if the termination was voluntary. Thus, an
executive who feels that his/her respon-
sibility, authority or status within the cor-
poration has been diminished after a takeover
may "pull his/her own ripcord." Kimberly-
Clark, for example, permits its officers to
collect 3 years full pay and benefits if for
any reason within 2 years after a merger he or
she chooses to resign (except the drastic cir-
cumstances of death, disability, or normal
retirement) (Kimberly-Clark Proxy Statement
3/15/82).
None of the remaining nine proxies explicitly
prohibit payment of salary and benefits if the
termination is voluntary. It is thus reason-
able to assume that "walkaway" clauses are an
all but universal feature of GP agreements.
"Giveback|;_Pro visions
"Giveback" provisions are aspects of GP
agreements that require executives who have
left the acquired company to return some or all
of their salary and benefits if and when they
begin other employment. One GP (Gulf Resources
and Chemical) explicitly stated that the ter-
minated executives would under no circumstatnces
forfeit any compensation acquired under the GP.
In fact, in the proxies of only five of the
firms in the sample were there any discussions
of "givebacks." And, in only two cases were
the "g.tve-backs" total, i.e. as soon as the
executi/e began to receive a salary elsewhere
all GP compensation would cease.
Compensation Provisions
The central provision in each of the GP's exam-
ined was compensation. In a few cases compen-
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satlon was provided through a guarantee of
employment, but In most cases compensation came
as a lump sum payment. The amount of compen-
sation ranged from one year to seven years of
salciry. Two to three years was most common.
In only seven of the proxies examined was the
compensation other than two or three years.
In addition to a salary settlement, nine of the
GP's provided bonus compensation as well. In
most cases the bonus related to the same years
as the SEilary settlement, but in one case
(Conoco) the bonus was based on the highest
bonus ever attained.
Other Benefits
Besides salary and bonuses, all but six of the
examined GP's contained other benefits for the
departing executive. Three of the GP's expli-
citly continued the general benefits packaige of
the corporation for the departed executives.
In six GP's stock options were specifically
guaranteed, in seven a retirement adjustment
plan was included, in five insurance benefits
continued and in one case moving expenses were
included.
In only three GP's were there estimates of the
total cost of the GP provisions. For Con Agra
the cost was estimated at $2,500,225 for 10
executives. For Gulf Resources and Chemical
Group the cost was estimated to be $9,400,000
for 13 employees. For Bendix the estimated
cost of the GP's was estimated to be $4,706,000
for 16 covered employees.
ARGUMENTS FOR
Though most of the commentary about GP's has
been negative, there are several arguments
raised by their proponents that must be con-
sidered. Perhaps the most common defense of
GP's is that they encourage executives to stay
with their firms in the event of a hostile
takeover attempt. This argument supposes that
without GP's the uncertainty surrounding a
takeover attempt might be sufficient to cause a
number of executives to "jump ship" at a time
of severe organizational trial. GP's thus
"buy" the loyalty of senior management.
However, one must ask whether there is any
justification for a policy which ostensibly
tries to encourage management to perform as it
should. Further, most takeover specialists
scoff at the notion that management is likely
to depart during a takeover attempt. They note
that there is virtually no evidence of managers
bailing out in a time of crisis. In fact, the
group dynamics of senior management are such
that to do so would be seen as "disloyal" and
the person bailing out would "lose face"
(McLaughlin, p. 48).
Sometimes one comes across the argument that
GP's are simply another form of executive com-
pensation similar to bonuses, stock options.
etc. They might then be viewed as just another
facet of a total executive compensation
package, eliminating yet another unnecessary
distraction of executive life.
There is generally little argument about com-
pensation levels that are determined in a free
market. However, executive compensation at
senior levels may not be determined strictly in
such a market. There is substantial evidence
that management effectively controls the boards
of many major firms. High levels of executive
compensation might thus be more a function of
political control of the firm than it is of
supply and demand.
Some companies (particularly those that have
GP's covering broad classes of managers)
justify GP's on the basis of rewarding employee
loyalty. Many companies feel that they have a
responsibility to their employees which is
nearly as important as their responsibility to
their stockholders and customers (Brenner and
Molander, 1977). GP's are one way of assuring
that new, uncaring senior management doesn't
run roughshod over the firm's old, loyal
employees.
Firms may well have some responsibilities to
groups other than shareholders. However, it is
not obvious that new management will simply
sweep away the target's previous employees.
Presumably the majority of the target's
employees are one of the valuable assets that
the raider would want to retain. It seems that
only senior management is in obvious jeopardy.
Hostile takeovers succeed only when existing
management has seriously neglected its duties
to its shareholders. All too often it seems
that this argument is simply a smokescreen that
senior management tries to hide behind.
Another argument sometimes seen is that GP's
can add to the acquisition cost of a takeover
and are thus a legitimate way of forcing the
raider to either think twice or raise the ante.
In a similar vein, it is argued that since GP's
generally go into effect only in the event of a
successful hostile takeover, they are a device
for raising the price to the raider but not to
a compatible "white knight."
This argument assumes that shareholders really
care whether their stock is purchased by a
raider or by a white knight. It is quite
likely that most don't. However, current man-
agement probably does. In fact, if the white
knight agrees to keep existing management on
(as part of a "deal" to easily acquire the
target) they may in fact be doing current
shareholders a disservice by, possibly,
accepting this merger simply because it is
better for management.
Finally, proponents of GP's contend that the
cost of the GP is borne by the stockholders of
the raiding firm and not by the stockholders of
their own firm. Thus, issues of fiduciary
responsibility to one's own stockholders
doesn't enter into this particular situation.
361
This argument Is fatally flawed. A "raiding"
firm is vrtlling to pay only so much to acquire
a target firm. If the target successfully
pumps up costs that the raider must pay, the
target is worth correspondingly less. In fact,
every additional million dollars that a raider
must pay the target's management is a million
less that it will pay the target's share-
holders. GP's thus ar^ a direct assessment on
the shareholders of the target firm, not those
of the raider.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST
On the other hand, there is growing criticism
of GP's. This section will analyze some of
that criticism from several different perspec-
tives. Most of this criticism stems from the
suspicion that GP's are implemented in order to
benefit existing management and not necessarily
shareholders. In fact, many feel that though
management will often try to cloak these
actions as increasing shareholder welfare, such
arguments are often very tortured.
Golden parachutes might thus be seen as yet
another manifestation of the effects on firm
actions when control shifts from stockholders
to manager. This phenomenon, first noted by
Berle and Means (1929), has been extensively
documented in the last two decades (Monsen and
Downs, 1963). Basically, these studies found
systematically inferior financial performance
for firms which were controlled by their mana-
gers versus those controlled by their stock-
holders .
Manaf^ement
As noted earlier there are conflicting theories
on whether or not GP's increase managment's
will to resist a hostile takeover attempt or
not. Most proponents of GP's claim that mana-
gement has an obligation to resist at least
some takeovers (in order to ultimately increase
shareholder welfare such as by finding a better
offer.) This theory suggests that GP's help
preserve the management team when cohesiveness
is required.
As argued in the previous section, there seems
to be little support for this notion. In fact,
logically it would seem that GP's would
actually decrease managerial resistance to a
hostile takeover attempt. Picture the belea-
gured executives of the target company who do
not have GP's. Their firm is a takeover target
(generally at a considerable premium over
recent market price) because some other company
believes that it can manage the target's
resources considerably more efficiently than
can the existing management. In other words
the market has given the management of the
target a failing grade. Job prospects, etc.
don't look good. Without a GP the target
firm's management has a very real incentive to
do whatever is necessary to preserve their
jobs. Note that this incentive may, in their
minds (after all Inanagers are profit maximizers
as well), supercede the goal of maximizing
shareholder profits.
On the other hand, if the target's management
can get GP's the cost (to them) of losing the
takeover battle decreases dramatically. In
fact, it is hard to imagine how a GP would on
the whole weight an individual manager's deci-
sion more toward fighting than toward "throwing
the game." Now this may in fact be desirable.
Easterbrook and Fischel in a recent issue of
the Harvard Law Review presented a very power-
ful case for ^ t a l managw^al passivity in the
face of a takeover attempt (Easterbrook and
Fischel, 1981). They contended that an;̂  mana-
gerial resistance ultimately decreases share-
holder welfare. GP's may be one way of moving
toward such passivity. However, it is ironic
that management justified GP's for precisely
the opposite reason. Of course it would be
embarrassing and possibly legally dangerous for
management to acknowledge that it must be
bribed in order to act in the shareholders'
best interest.
Board _of_Directqrs
Another perspective to examine this issue from
is that of the board of directors. Only the
board can give top managers GP's. Why might
they do so if doing so is not clearly for the
shareholder's benefit? Unfortunately, there is
considerable evidence that the boards of many
major firms have, in effect, been captured by
senior management. Often board members serve
only at the discretion of the firm's president
and have been reputedly forced off boards by
unhappy presidents for exhibiting some indepen-
dence .
In fact, the Brunswick Corporation enacted GP's
not only for its managers but also for certain
members of its board. Any outside director
over 55 years of age and with more than five
year's service could at his/her discretion quit
after a hostile takeover and continue receiving
his/her annual retainer of $22,000 for life
(Klein, p. 56). The justification for this GP
is difficult to ascertain.
Stockholder
In a market economy firms are, in theory,
formed by investors who put their own capital
at risk and hire manstgers in order to realize
certain goals, generally financial. The prin-
cipal duty of management is thus to meet the
goals set by the stockholders. Management's
compensation is justified by the return that
stockholders receive from management's deci-
sions. It is assumed that higher pay, bonuses
and other compensation give management addi-
tional incentive to manage the stockholders'
assets wisely and efficiently.
In fact, any managerial decisions that appear
primarily self-serving and that cannot be
justified on the basis of increasing share-
holder wealth are not protected by the business
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judgement rule and expose managers to legal
risks. Thus if the thesis that GP's represent
wealth transfers from stockholders to managers
(propounded in the previous section) is correct
then there is no justification from the
stockholder's perspective for GP's.
Legal Issues
Business Week suggests that GP's are func-
tionally equivalent of theft. Are they legal?
Can shareholders successfully sue and claim
damages? At this time no decisions involving
GP's has been rendered. However, at least two
shareholder suits involving GP's (Brunswick and
Gulf Chemicals and Resources Group) have been
filed.
On the surface, however, it seems unlikely that
the courts will find against management in
these cases. The business judgement rule has,
to date, proven to be an effective shield
against virtually all suits filed that question
management decisions. In fact, the courts have
consistently ruled that "mainagement has the
right, and even the duty, to oppose a tender
offer it determines contrary to the firm's best
interests" (Easterbrook and Fischel, p. 1163).
To the extent that management can successfully
claim that GP's aid such opposition the courts
are likely to uphold them. Yet, such practices
do appear to be a serious violation of the
fiduciary responsibility of the members of the
board. As such there is a finite possibility
that the courts may actually set a new prece-
dent in this area.
Ethical Issues
Even if GP's were to prove to be legal, they
still wouldn't, necessarily, be ethical. In
fact, it's difficult to find any possible ethi-
cal justification for GP's. This isn't to
suggest that high compensation in itself is
unethical. If a manager is hired for
$1,000,000 or more per year jji an arm's length
transaction, then there is no ethical problem
whatsoever. Income differentials are a
necessary element of a market economy and one
that helps drive it toward efficiency.
However, as noted above there is reason to
believe that GP's are not granted "at arm's
length." Multimillion dollar salaries can be
justified since the fortunes of a major company
can turn on the judgement of senior management..
However, a multimillion dollar reward for so
mismainaging a company as to depress its stock
price to the point that an outside group is
willing to pay a considerable sum in order to
gain control of its assets is unconscionable.
Recent evidence indicates that takeovers result
in gains to the stockholders ranging from 14J
to 5OJ (Easterbrook and Fischel, p. 1187). One
way of viewing this premium may be as the
extent to which the target firm was mismanaged
by its previous management.
In fact, the existence of GP's today is very
similar to the existence of insider trading
prior to 1933. Insider trading has always
amounted to theft, even before it was made
illegal. Likewise, GP's are a direct and
unjustified transfer of funds from shareholders
to managers.
Public Relations
GP's are a public disaster. Even the business
press attacks them. In a time of economic
hardship aind union givebacks news of GP's can
prove, at best, to be a serious embarrassment
as International Harvester discovered in late
1982. Even if GP's could be justified economi-
cally, ethically, or however, one must ask
whether or not the existence of GP's compen-
sates for the various costs associated with the
negative publicity.
Public Policy
This may, in fact, be the key perspective. As
argued earlier a hostile takeover occurs only
when a group external to the target firm per-
ceives that they could do a considerably better
job of managing the target firm's assets than
current management is. GP's might then be seen
as a reward for poor management. This cer-
tainly turns any incentive system on its head.
Though the authors are not suggesting that any
memagers have consciously driven a firm into
the ground in order to collect their GP's, this
frightening possibility does exist. As a
matter of public policy it would be wise to
encourage effective, efficient management and
discourage the opposite. Regulations prohi-
biting GP's would be one step in that direc-
tion. However, to be truly effective, they
would need to be coupled to rules such as those
proposed by Easterbrook and Fischel which would
reduce or eliminate management's right to
oppose a takeover.
CONCLUSIONS
Golden parachutes are both morally indefensible
and hurt the public image of American business.
Though the particular managers involved are
probably better off because of such contracts,
the American business system is undoubtedly
wounded by it. Not only is it in the public
interest and the stockholder interest to elimi-
nate GP's, but it is also in the interest of
the American business community.
If such abuses continue, public outcry and
media attention will certainly provoke new laws
and regulations that will inhibit or even eli-
minate the issuance of GP's. Sethi has argued
that "...the corporate interest must emanate
from the public interest and cannot be incon-
sistent with it" (Sethi, 1982, p. 3t). If
American business is perceived by the public as
attempting to line their own pockets new laws
and regulations will soon follow.
(References will be provided upon request.)
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